Pickett or Pettigrew? An Historical Essay — Edition Insights

A Controversy Framed by Dedication and Preface

Bond’s dedication and preface establish the essay’s combative, corrective purpose. He describes the 'slander' against Pettigrew’s men as a 'great wrong' that he seeks to right. The preface also reveals Bond’s method: he combines personal knowledge, testimony from comrades, and statistics from the War Department. He acknowledges that the first edition lacked access to the Official Records, but that this revised edition benefits from them. Bond’s tone is resolute, even defiant, as he writes, 'it is best to “hew to the line and let the chips fall as they may.”' This phrase captures his willingness to challenge established narratives, even at the risk of offending personal friends.

Brigade Histories as Evidence of Character and Performance

Bond devotes substantial space to the histories of the brigades that fought under Pettigrew: Ramseur’s, Lane’s, and Archer’s. These are not dry lists of engagements; Bond infuses them with personality and moral judgment. Of Ramseur’s brigade, he writes that their 'fondness for prayer meeting and Psalm singing united with an ever readiness to fight, reminds one of Cromwell’s Ironsides.' He notes that the brigade 'fought well at Seven Pines' and 'occupied the bloody lane at Sharpsburg.' Lane’s brigade, he reports, lost 56 percent in the seven days’ fight, and at Chancellorsville suffered 739 killed and wounded. Bond uses these statistics to build a case for the brigade’s courage and sacrifice, implicitly arguing that such men deserve recognition for their role at Gettysburg.

The Assault Itself: Direction, Misunderstanding, and Rallying

Bond’s account of the July 3 assault focuses on tactical details that support his thesis. He describes the 'point of direction' as 'a small cluster of trees opposite to and in front of Archer’s brigade.' He notes that while the rest of the line dressed on Archer’s brigade, 'four and a half regiments of Lane’s dressed to the left' due to a misunderstanding. This caused them to go beyond the Emmitsburg Road before falling back. Bond emphasizes that Lane’s brigade 'remained fighting till all the rest of the line had given way' and was only withdrawn by General Trimble. He also includes Colonel Frye’s testimony: 'I heard General Pettigrew calling to rally them on the left (referring to a brigade which had just given way).' These details position Pettigrew as a leader actively trying to hold the line, not as a passive participant.

Bond’s essay is best read as a piece of advocacy history, written by a participant with a personal stake in the outcome. Readers should note that Bond’s evidence is selective and his tone partisan; he does not pretend to neutrality. The value of the work lies in its preservation of firsthand accounts and its challenge to a narrative that had already hardened by 1900. For those interested in how the Lost Cause myth was contested from within, Bond’s pamphlet offers a specific, localized counterargument.

I found myself thinking about Bond’s quiet insistence that a name can carry a battle’s whole weight—how one man’s reputation eclipses another’s lived truth. That same ache of forgotten voices lingers in The Old Front Line — Inside the Classic, where the land itself remembers what the records often blur. Strange, how a century later, we’re still sorting the mud from the memory.